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Pawel Jozefiak's avatar

The Rehberger disclosure is the example I keep coming back to. Converting a coding assistant into an exfiltration engine using its own credentials - not a hypothetical, that's a Tuesday.

Running an autonomous agent with broad system access taught me this the hard way. Started with long-lived API keys because it was easy. Then realized every key was a liability that never expired. Moved to scoped, short-lived tokens per task type and it immediately reduced the blast radius.

The ephemeral identity problem is real. My agent spawns sub-agents needing different access levels for seconds at a time. Traditional IAM wasn't built for 'exists for 30 seconds, needs write access to one file, then disappears.'

What worries me most: most people building agents right now aren't thinking about this at all.

Fernando Lucktemberg's avatar

Spot on. The 'convenience over security' gap in agent development is wider than most realize. We’re essentially handing agents the keys to the kingdom without an audit trail or an expiration date. Your move to ephemeral, scoped tokens is exactly the path forward—we need to move away from static credentials toward an identity model that is as dynamic as the agents themselves.

I’m interested in how are you currently managing the orchestration of those 30-second tokens? Is it a custom shim or a specific framework?

Pawel Jozefiak's avatar

This is a specific framework actually - very custom and raw for now, but - working fine!